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Abstract
Why do some societies fail to adopt more e¢ cient institutions in response to changing economic condi-
tions? And why are such failures often associated with a rise in traditional ideological beliefs? We propose
an explanation that highlights the interplay or lack thereof between productivity shocks, institutions,
and ideology. We conceptualize and formalize ideology as the process through which individuals use sim-
plifying heuristics to make generalizations about the complex environment within which they operate.
When productivity shocks occur, there is uncertainty regarding how new, more "appropriate" ideologies
will interact with the new economic conditions. This uncertainty discourages investment in institutions
and the cultural capital necessary to take advantage of new production possibilities, and accordingly,
generates ideological movements that place a higher premium on traditional values. Historical analytic
narratives support the theory, including Ottoman reform initiatives, the Japanese Tokugawa reforms and
Meiji Restoration, and the Tongzhi Restoration in Qing China.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Why do some societies fail to adopt political or economic institutions that are commensurate with a changing
technological and economic landscape? History is replete with instances of societies cognizant of, but failing
to adopt, advanced market structures, legal codes, and organizational forms. For instance, Kuran (2011)
notes that European commercial law was widely used and permitted in the Ottoman Empire, but only for
European merchants. The various European legal codes permitted much more complex nancial transactions
than what was available to Ottoman merchants. Why did the Ottomans not adopt such obviously benecial
institutions? Likewise, the Chinese Qing Empire famously turned inward in the 17th and 18th centuries,
just as contact with the West made it obvious to casual observers that Western organizational forms were far
superior. In both cases, the stagnant society missed out on a transition to a more e¢ cient economy. Given
the stakes involved, why do institutional calcications ever occur?
The answer most commonly given in the literature lays emphasis on a societys political economy: non-
adoption occurs when it is in the interest of the politically powerful for it not to occur (North 1981, 1990;
North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Blaydes and Chaney 2013).1 This view is
rooted in Norths (1990) idea that a societys formal institutions those political, legal, social, and economic
mechanisms that establish the formal "rules of the game" and the incentives faced by the players therein
are the key drivers of economic and political outcomes. The "formal institutions of political economy" view
clearly explains many cases of non-adoption, and it is not the intention of this paper to undermine the
importance of this view. Yet, there are numerous examples of institutional non-adoption despite adoption
being consistent with the interests of powerful decision makers. For example, the anti-science movement in the
U.S. has resulted in widespread climate change denial (and restrictions placed on federal funding of climate
science) and the widespread use of textbooks challenging evolution. While there are certainly interests
that gain from climate science denial (energy companies) and evolution denial (certain religious groups),
the traditional political economy approach has a di¢ cult time explaining why such views have become
so widespread in the general population, especially since their appeal is growing despite improvements in
science. A second example comes from contemporary Iraq and Egypt, where attempts to adopt or impose
democratic institutions failed despite being in the interest of the politically powerful, who were in position
to gain o¢ ce via election. In each case, chaos dominated the post-election political and economic scene,
threatening any chance of democratic institutions succeeding.
Moreover, the standard political economy explanation cannot account for the following curious stylized
fact: the rejection of more e¢ cient institutions against the backdrop of rapidly changing economic conditions
1This view is particularly prevalent in the related literature on technology non-adoption (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006;
Chaudry and Garner 2007; Cos¸gel et al. 2012; Rubin 2017).
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is frequently coupled with traditional ideology dominating discourse. By "ideology", we mean the shared
cognitive rules or shortcuts that people within a society use to interpret the complex world around them
(North 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985, 2005; Henrich et al. 2001; Nunn 2012; Mokyr 2016; Greif and
Mokyr 2016; Alston et al. 2016, Giuliano and Nunn 2016). Therefore, a "traditional ideology" is one in
which a society interprets the world around them through the lens of traditional values that "worked well in
the past," even if what made the society successful in the past is poorly understood. The U.S. anti-science
movement provides a straight-forward example of such a traditional ideology. Other contemporary examples
abound, including the widely expressed desire among some segments of the U.S. population to "return to
the 1950s" and the ubiquitous Middle Eastern trope of "returning to the Golden Age of Islam."
Such traditional values are often incompatible with advanced technologies and institutions because they
were formed when the technological and institutional environment was drastically di¤erent. In the Ottoman
case, after it was clear that Western Europe had far surpassed the Empire, it was still true that "even the
most intelligent and perceptive of Ottoman reformers at this time adhered to the basic premise that the
Ottoman system was far superior to anything that the indel might develop" (Shaw 1976, p. 175). Other
examples include the famed "social decay" of the late Roman Empire, the inward turns of Qing China
and Shogunate Japan in response to contact with Europe, and British unpreparedness for World War I.
These examples are all reective of societies built on ideologies associated with past glory but ill-suited for
a much changed world.2 Why do such traditionalist sociopolitical movements so often go hand-in-hand with
institutional stagnation?
This paper presents a model that addresses these puzzles by endogenizing institutional change and ide-
ological evolution. In doing so, the model gives structure to Norths (1990) insight that formal institutions
work in the intended manner only when complemented by a societys informal institutions. Such a frame-
work, like the one laid out in great length by Greif (2006), acknowledges that social norms, beliefs, and
informal organizations matter for economic development.3 Importantly, it also suggests that formal political
institutions are malleable, with the softer and harder to measure institutional determinants bearing on
the formal rules of the game.
Our model indicates that the interplay between productivity shocks on the one hand and ideology on
the other may well account for the causal channels through which a societys formal institutions evolve and
come to impinge upon its economic development. Specically, we employ an overlapping generations model
where the economys production technology is subject to exogenous productivity shocks. (Alternatively, one
2More generally, Boyd and Richerson (1985, p. 40) note that "historians, sociologists, and anthropologists have found a number
of striking examples of cultural inertia, situations in which cultural ancestry is important in changed situations or where
traditional cultural di¤erences persist in similar environments."
3 Informal institutions and culture have recently received renewed emphasis as a key contributor of Englands industrialization.
See, most importantly, Mokyr (2009, 2016), McCloskey (2010, 2016), and de la Croix, Doepke, and Mokyr (2016).
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can entertain the notions that the society receives unexpected inows of human capital via immigration or
it is not on the technological frontier but, instead, is exposed to a new technology.)
In our model, ideological beliefs provide individuals the simplifying heuristics through which they com-
prehend the best they can the complex world around them.4 Formally, we model ideology as a mapping from
i) actual economic inputs and ii) actual institutions onto some value of "perceived" inputs and institutions.
It is the "perceived" values that matter for labor productivity and actual output; a society that lacks the
ideological capacity to employ advanced technologies or institutions will not be able to employ them to their
full capacity.5
In addition to how we have dened ideology above, ideology di¤ers from traditional factors of production
(land, labor, and physical and human capital) in that more is not always better. For instance, consider
a Westerner with 21st-century ideology being "dropped" into an environment with tribal institutions and
ideologies. Despite the fact that her ideology is better suited for the more productive institutional settings
of the West, tribal technologies and institutions would be foreign to her. Hence, tribe members would be
more productive than her within the context of the tribal economy. Of course, she would be much more
productive than tribe members if they were placed in a setting with Western institutions and ideologies.
In the model, ideological beliefs can update over generations to become better suited for the economic
environment. The means through which ideology updates is intergenerational transmission; ideology is passed
down from parent to child as in Boyd and Richerson (1985) or Bisin and Verdier (2001).6 Parents can, at
cost, provide their children with a new ideology that provides them with the means to equip themselves with
the cognitive capacity to assess the production environment through a more objective lens (via, for example,
education).7 Our model extends on prevailing models of cultural transmission by formalizing the idea that
while such an objective lens is more compatible with the post-productivity shock economy than the parents
own ideology, there is uncertainty associated with this new ideology, since it has never been employed in
the current economic and institutional context.8 Parents do not know how the new ideology maps economic
4We are not the rst to view ideology in such a manner. We lay out in detail the literature and our formalization of ideological
beliefs in Section 2.1.1.
5As it will become apparent when we present our model, our key contentions and ndings permit the actual inputs of technology
and institutions to a¤ect TFP. For simplicity, we focus on the impact of technology and institutions on TFP via their a¤ect on
perceptions.
6 In reality, ideology is also transmitted by ones peers, as well. Such transmission is one of the mechanisms employed by Bisin
and Verdier (2001) and is seminal to the cultural transmission literature in anthropology (see, e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985;
Henrich 2001). We simplify the analysis by focusing on inter-generational cultural transmission. This comes with the benet
of making the intuition transparent, but the cost of missing intra-generational dynamics that may explain a lack of ideological
change under some circumstances.
7Alternatively, the channel of ideological transmission could well be a public education system that is used to propagate a political
regimes (potentially self-serving and preserving) ideological and political doctrines. In that case, schooling could be free but
time spent at school would instill and propagate the existing state ideologies and political doctrines. In order to escape such
indoctrination, parents would need to invest time or resources in a form of private education that would provide the o¤spring
with the cognitive skills necessary to assess the technological and productive environment more objectively. We revisit this
issue in the Appendix.
8 In a related paper, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) argue that the uncertainty associated with the distribution of gains and losses
from reform can prevent reforms from happening even if they would be popular ex post. Although the source of uncertainty
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inputs and institutions onto realized values. Sometimes they guess correctly, sometimes they overestimate,
and sometimes they underestimate.9
Finally, there is a political ruler who maximizes tax revenue over the innite planning horizon. This ruler
can invest in improving the societys institutions to better accommodate technology, although institutional
change is costly. Since we are interested in understanding why a society fails to adopt institutions even when
it is in the interest of the powerful to encourage adoption, we assume that the ruler benets from more
e¢ cient institutions.
The primary insight of our model is that there is an interplay between the uncertainty associated with
new ideologies on the one hand and institutional evolution on the other. The degree of uncertainty associated
with new ideologies can drive parents to emphasize the intergenerational transmission of their prevailing,
traditional ideologies, which they know with certainty, at the expense of investing in a new cognitive frame-
work for their children.10 In turn, political rulers fail to adopt more e¢ cient institutions even if and despite
the fact that doing so would be a rst-order economic improvement. Hence, both the existing (backward)
state of economic development and the societys ideological beliefs would be unlikely to change even though
a change in either ideology or institutions might trigger a positive response in the other. In other words,
institutional conservatism is an outcome; it is not a root cause of failure to adopt more e¢ cient institutions.11
This paper is not the rst one in economics to suggest an interaction between culture and institutions.12
Indeed, some recent papers that are particularly relevant to our hypothesis attempt to explain why culture
persists in spite of changing economic circumstances. Giuliano and Nunn (2017) show that, consistent
with the anthropology literature, societies tend to emphasize traditional values more in relatively stable and
predictable environments. They nd a negative correlation between negative economic shocks and traditional
values both cross-sectionally and intertemporally. Our model suggests the complement to their argument,
indicating that there is a positive correlation between traditional values and uncertainty related to positive
economic shocks.13 The recent theory paper most similar to ours is Bisin and Verdier (2017), who also
in our paper is di¤erent, the primary insight di¤erentiating our paper is that we show how uncertainty associated with new
ideologies retards institutional development.
9Note that such uncertainty would also arise in a model of horizontal cultural transmission.
10 In order for conservative outcomes to arise, our model does not require parents valuing their own "identity" (as in Akerlof and
Kranton [2000] or Bénabou and Tirole [2011]) and thus wanting to pass that identity onto their children. Nor does it require
parents wanting to require a reputation for making the right choices (and thus choosing what worked for them in the past), as in
Prendergast and Stole (1996). Indeed, an attractive feature of our model is that we nd conditions under which "conservative"
outcomes arise (with respect to ideology) despite parents having no preference for conservatism.
11For more on conservatism as an outcome of institutional environments, see Rubin (2011, 2017).
12For overviews of recent developments of various aspects of this literature, see Guiso et al. (2006), Nunn (2012), Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2013), Algan and Cahuc (2013), Alesina and Giuliano (2015), and Gershman (2016).
13There are many other important works addressing cultural persistence in the face of changing economic and political circum-
stances. Examples include Putnam (1993), Greif (1994, 2006), Giuliano (2007), Guiso et al. (2008, 2016), Tabellini (2008,
2010), Greif and Tadelis (2010), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011, 2016), Voigtländer and Voth
(2012), Greif, Iyigun and Sasson (2012), Greif and Iyigun (2013), Jha (2013), Alesina et al. (2013), Grosfeld et al. (2013),
Alston et al. (2016), Becker et al. (2016), Buggle (2016), Greif and Tabellini (2017), Lowes et al. (2017), Nunn and de la Sierra
(2017), and Karaja and Rubin (2017).
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study the co-evolution of institutions and culture. They argue that culture and institutions may act as
complements or substitutes. In the former (latter) case, the interaction of the two strengthens (weakens)
the equilibrium patterns and institutions are more (less) likely to produce their desired e¤ect. Acemoglu
and Jackson (2016) investigate the coevolution of social norms and the enforcement of codied laws. They
argue that laws which are in conict with prevailing social norms may be counterproductive; it is only when
such laws are gradually introduced that they are e¤ective. Both Bisin and Verdier (2017) and Acemoglu and
Jackson (2016) provide valuable insights into the co-evolution of institutions and culture. But one important
aspect of this co-evolution which both papers fail to adequately address is why institutions fail to update in
the face of changes which make the prevailing institutions and ideological beliefs obsolete.14 This is hardly a
trivial issue; failure to adopt modern institutions is a primary reason for the failure of laggard economies to
converge with the leaders (North 1981; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2005; Rodrik, Subramanian,
and Trebbi 2004; Greif 2006; Kuran 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Rubin 2017). Our paper addresses
precisely this issue. Moreover, it is the rst example of its kind to link the interplay among technologies,
culture, and institutions on the one hand with sociopolitical movements that hinder or aid change on the
other.
After we present our baseline theory, we turn to a discussion of three historical analytic narratives
pertinent to our model. The rst narrative is a historiography of the Ottoman Empire, where reformist
movements spanned from clearly traditionalist, starting in the early-17th century and spanning through
the 18th century, to the unabashedly modernizing Tanzimat Reform era during the second half of the 19th
century. The second narrative addresses 18th-19th century Japan, ranging from the nal century and a half
of the Tokugawa Shogunate, when three reformist movements had clear and specic traditionalist goals, to
the Meiji Restoration in the middle of the 19th century, which was driven in large part by an acknowledgment
that the traditional organization of Japanese society was inadequate to deal with the modern challenges of
adopting Western technologies and methods. The nal narrative is a discussion of the Tongzhi Restoration
in Qing China, which presents a particularly illuminating example of traditional values dominating discourse
in response to foreign technological and institutional innovations.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 provides historical
analytic narratives pertinent to our model, and Section 4 o¤ers some concluding thoughts.
14The model in Bisin and Verdier (2017) has institutional design built into it. It therefore does not address how institutions and
culture coevolve in response to a shock that changes the conditions under which the institutions were originally designed. An
implication of Acemoglu and Jackson (2016) is that such a shock could be accounted for by gradual institutional change.
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2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Consider an innite-horizon, overlapping generations economy with one representative young agent, one
representative old agent, and a Ruler (R) in each period.15 Each agent lives for two periods (one as young
and one as old) except for the Ruler, who is innitely-lived.16 Old agents are productive but young agents
are not. Old agents have preferences over their own consumption and the consumption possibilities of their
children, while the Ruler has preferences over current and future tax revenue.
Old agents are endowed with one unit of time, which they can only spend on labor (`t 2 [0; 1]). The
output produced by their labor is yt = At`t, where At is a productivity parameter that we shall discuss in
further detail below.
Individuals possess "ideological capital" which comes to bear on their labor productivity when they work
in the second period. Ideological capital is transmitted from parents to their o¤spring via costly investment,
a process which we shall motivate and discuss next.
2.1.1 Ideologies and Mechanisms of Intergenerational Transmission
Denitions & Functions A salient feature of ideology is that it helps individuals make generalizations
about the complex environment within which they operate and about which they have incomplete knowledge.
Accordingly, ideologies not only inuence how individuals interpret their experiences, but also complement
the factual information they possess. Henrich et al. (2001) provide evidence of this aspect of ideology,
showing that participants in experimental games from various small-scale societies around the world act
consistent with behaviors they employ in di¤erent (economic) settings. The most likely explanation for
their ndings is that being placed in new situations cues a response that has worked in other, more familiar
situations what we denote as ideology. Implicit in these assertions is the notion that ideologies may be
economically useful; although the ideology which maximizes the economic "tness" of a population may not
always win out (Boyd and Richerson 2005; Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson 2008; Greif and Tadelis 2010).
Indeed, the root of the idea that ideologies help to serve an economic purpose can be traced to Adam Smith,
who recognized one form of ideology, religion, as a rational means for individuals to enhance their human
capital (North 1981, p. 49; Iyigun, Mocan, and Owen 2001).
Naturally, the purpose of ideologies can be interpreted in di¤erent ways. For instance, one can subscribe
15There is no population growth in the model because our empirical applications are not a¤ected by population growth. Interesting
dynamics with respect to population growth could arise, but they do not alter the fundamental insights of the model.
16This formulation is consistent with a ruler who also lives two periods, but whose dynasty is in political control over the innite
time horizon and whose time discount factor is constant across generations.
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to the view that ideologies are non-deductive sets of beliefs about right" and wrong," and that they serve
a more normative approach to life rather than provide a general framework with which to make judgements
about how things work (Henrich et al. 2001; Boyd and Richerson 2005). In presenting the model below, we
adopt the notion that such a framework forms the basis of making positive judgements. Put another way,
we argue that, while ideologies may help individuals form beliefs about what is right" and what is wrong,"
they do so within the context of some working hypotheses about their economic environment (Mokyr 2016;
Greif and Mokyr 2016).
North (1981, p. 47) best summarizes the functional role of ideologies that we employ below: Ideology
is an economizing device by which individuals come to terms with their environment and are provided with
a world viewso that the decision making process is simplied. [Ideology] is inextricably linked with moral
and ethical judgments about the fairness of the world the individual perceives. This situation clearly implies
a notion of possible alternatives. Individuals alter their ideological perspectives when their experiences are
inconsistent with their ideology. In e¤ect, they attempt to develop a new set of rationalizations that are a
better twith their experiences."
Intergenerational Transmission In the spirit of the denitions above and, specically, based on the way
North dened ideology, we assume that an individuals ideological stock helps her to assess and form an
opinion on the technology and institutions prevalent in the economy. Ideological interpretation is necessary
because, without the simplifying heuristics that ideologies o¤er individuals, the technological and institutional
environments in which they operate is too complex for full and neutral comprehension.
In particular, an ideology Dj ; j = O; N (for oldand new), is a continuous mapping, f : R2 ! R2,
such that
Dj(Gt, It) =
n
~Gt, ~It
o
, j = O;N , (1)
where Gt (2 R+) and It (2 R+) denote the prevailing states of technology and institutional e¢ cacy in period
t and ~Gt, ~It are their inferred or "perceived" levels, respectively, by the individual who possesses the ideology
Dj ; j = O;N .17
In terms of the intergenerational transmission of ideologies, parents can pass on to their o¤spring an
incumbent ideology, DO(Gt, It), at no cost. We refer to DO as the "traditional" ideology, since it is the
one associated with previous generations. With this traditional ideology, we have DO(Gt, It) = fGt, Itg.
More specically, DO(Gt, It) is such that:
17One could imagine that ideology is continuous, rather than discrete as we have modeled it. Yet, Henrich and Boyd (2002)
and Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson (2008) show that thinking of cultural evolution in discrete terms yields similar results while
having the advantage of being much easier to conceptualize.
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1. If there has been investment in the intergenerational transmission of ideologies at any time in the
past and neither the technology nor the institutions have upgraded since then, we have DO(Gt, It)
= fGt, Itg, reecting the assumption that  = 1;
2. If the technology or institutions have updated in period t, then the traditional ideology yieldsDO(Gt; It)
= fGt, Itg where  6 1: This reects the assumption that, without an update in ideologies, tradi-
tional ideologies may fall short of fully and without bias distilling the TFP impact of a new economic
environment (i.e., Gt; It).
Alternatively, parents can choose to instill in their o¤spring an available but untested ideology, DN (Gt,
It), at a cost of zAt, z > 0: We might think of the cost, z, as investment in education or the opportunity
cost of permitting ones child to socialize with their peers instead of working in the elds. Due to the fact
that this new ideology is yet untested, it involves a risk/reward trade-o¤ when it is rst used. Specically,
with a new technology Gt or a new set of institutions It in place, we have:
DN (Gt, It) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
fGt, Itg with probability 1  2p
fGt + g, It + ig with probability p
fGt   g, It   ig with probability p
. (2)
Thus, the new ideology o¤ers the potential to fully distill the actual TFP e¤ects of the new technology
and institutions in expectation, but it does so at the risk of undershooting and overshooting them with
likelihood of p; p 2 [0; 0:5].18
2.1.2 Technology, Ideology and Labor Productivity
Labor productivity At derives from the prevailing state of technology, Gt, and institutional e¢ cacy, It, as
viewed through the ideological lens through which the individual interprets them. In particular,
At = 
[D
j(Gt, It)] j = O;N , (3)
where the function 
 : R2 ! R is strictly increasing and monotonic in both of its arguments.19
18As we already discussed in the introduction, the manner in which we formalize ideology entails that more is not always better,
as is generally assumed of traditional factors of production. Revisiting the example we gave in the introduction, consider a
Westerner with ideology DO who is transplanted to a tribal economy with values of Gt and It she has never seen before. If she
does not update her ideology, see will see Gt and It biased by , whereas a native to the tribe would see Gt and It at their
correct levels (i.e.,  = 1).
19As we noted previously, it is not essential that only "perceptions" of technology and institutions determine labor productivity
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In terms of the state of technology, we assume that there is an incumbent technology in period t which
has a TFP of GO. We then assume that the economy is exposed to a new technology with a strictly higher
TFP in period t+ 1. Specically, we let Gt = GO and Gt+1 = GN , where GN  GO,  > 1.
Finally, institutional quality in period t + 1, It+1, is determined by the Rulers investment choices in
a manner we shall discuss formally below. Informally, we assume that the Ruler chooses the socially op-
timal institutions, given ideological investment and the state of technology. We could consider alternative
specications in which the Ruler acts in the interest of a sociopolitical or economic class, as in some other
conventional political economy models (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). Such a model could also gener-
ate mechanisms through which institutions would not be upgraded even when it is economically e¢ cient to
do so. Yet, we aim to shed light on institutional and ideological dynamics when change is in the interest of
the ruling elite. Thus, we choose a specication in which the socially e¢ cient courses of action are aligned
with the Rulers interests.
2.2 The Equilibrium
2.2.1 A Benchmark without Ideologies
To highlight our papers main contribution regarding the role of ideologies in institutional change, consider
rst a special case of our framework in which  = 1. In this case, the incumbent ideology is always and
maximally e¢ cient in that DO(Gt, It) = fGt, Itg. Hence, we e¤ectively have At = 
(Gt, It), and the Rulers
problem becomes much simplied, as we illustrate next.
The Rulers Problem After observing the realization of Gt = GN , the Ruler chooses institutions, It, to
maximize lifetime tax revenue discounted at rate  2 (0; 1), minus the cost of maintaining institutions, c ().20
The cost of maintaining institutions is strictly increasing and convex in expenditures so that c (0) = 0, c0 > 0,
and c00 > 0. We assume there is some exogenously set tax rate,  2 [0; 1], which determines the portion of
output the ruler receives.21 The period t strategy set of the Ruler can therefore be written as sRt = It 2 R+.
The Rulers utility is written:
URt =
1X
j=t
j tE

yj   c (Ij) jsoj ; sRj

. (4)
and output. What is essential is that, besides the other more conventional determinants, "perceptions" of technology and
institutions have some inuence on labor productivity as well.
20Recall that we rule out technology non-adoption. In a setting in which political rulers or some vested interests can block new
technologies, stagnation in technologies, institutions, and ideologies trivially and naturally occurs. Instead, our main focus is
one in which technological change is the main driver of the evolution and the interplay between socially prevalent ideological
beliefs and political institutions.
21The assumption that the tax rate is exogenous is not far-fetched if the model is applied to the pre-modern setting, where
rulers had weak scal capacity and generally extracted the maximum amount possible subject to the constraint of weak scal
institutions. Nevertheless, one can extend our model to endogenize the tax rates although doing so would not have a qualitative
material impact on our key contentions.
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In every period, the Ruler maximizes (4) by choosing, 8j 2 [t;1], Ij , subject to yj = Aj`j and Aj given
by (3). Given that the incumbent ideology is "perfect" (in that  = 1), old agents never choose to invest
in updating the prevalent ideology, so that Dj(Gt, It) = DO(Gt, It) = fGt, Itg in every period t. On this
basis, the Rulers optimal behavior is implicitly dened by the following rst-order condition:

1  
@E(At)
@It
  c0 (It) 6 0, (5)
where
@E(At)
@It
= 
2 DO2 (GN ; It) , (6)
where, due to the fact that GN  GO and the ideology in e¤ect is "perfect", we have 
2 DO2 (GN ; It) =

2(G
O; It).22 On this basis, we can now readily show that the Rulers optimal choice is to always upgrade
institutions to keep pace with new technologies, so long as institutions and technology are complementary
in the production process. Specically, using the implicit function theorem, we have,
@It
@
=   
21
1  


22
1     c
00

. (7)
Given that we assume c00 > 0 and 
22 < 0, equation (7) is unambiguously and strictly positive if
institutions and technology are complements in TFP (i.e., 
12 > 0). Hence, we have a case in which, save for
the classic arguments of how a variety of rent-seeking behavior on the part of the ruling class sties "better"
institutions, technological change would always spur institutions more amenable to economic productivity.
2.2.2 The Generalized Model
Now we illustrate how ideological beliefs come to impinge on the dynamics of institutional change. In our
more general case where ideologies that are transmitted intergenerationally come to bear on labor produc-
tivity, the Ruler and Citizens both face uncertainty. In deciding whether to invest in "better" institutions,
the Ruler grapples with the Citizens choice of intergenerational ideological investment, and the latter takes
into account whether the former will invest in institutions that are more conducive for labor productivity.
The Rulers Problem The Rulers problem is still specied as we exposited above with the exception that,
here, ideological investments matter. Thus, equation (6) can no longer be simplied because the incumbent
ideology no longer helps to perfectly observe technology and institutions after the shock (and hence   1).
The Ruler takes as given the ideological decision of the Citizen (i.e., Dj(Gt, It), j = O;N), and chooses
22This reects the fact that, in this case, DO2 = 1.
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institutional investment on the basis of the following rst-order conditions, which are slightly amended
versions of (5) and (6):

1  
@E(At)
@It
  c0 (It) 6 0, (8)
where
@E(At)
@It
= E
h

2 Dj2(GN ; It)
i
j = O; N . (9)
The CitizensProblem Simultaneous with the institutional choice of the Ruler, old agents decide their level
of consumption and whether they will invest in the transmission of new ideological beliefs to their o¤spring.
They do so by maximizing their utility from their own consumption and the consumption possibilities of their
children, subject to zAt1N + ct  (1  ) yt, where zAt; z > 0, represents the pecuniary cost of transmitting
the untested, new ideology DN (Gt, It) to ones o¤spring and 1N is an indicator function that switches on
when the Citizen invests in the new ideology.23 The old citizens choices are conditional on the prevailing
states of technology (Gt), institutions (It), and the tax rate (). The period t strategy set of the old agent
is therefore denoted sot = (1N ; ct) 2 f0; 1g  R+. Old agents are altruistic, placing weight  2 R+ on the
consumption possibilities of their children (i.e., (1  )At+1). Assuming log utility, the utility of the old
agent is written:
Uot = log (ct) +  log[(1  )E(At+1)] . (10)
The citizen maximizes (10) by choosing ct and whether to invest in DN for its child, subject to zAt1N +ct 
(1  ) yt.
Intra-Temporal Equilibrium The intra-temporal equilibrium of such an economy is one in which each
player takes the optimal choices of the other as given and decides on her optimal allocations. This involves
an intra-temporal equilibrium where the optimal choices of the Ruler and the Citizen are consistent with
each other (in that, the behavior each takes as given in deciding their optimal choices is the optimal response
of the other agent).
Accordingly, the Ruler calculates two optimal investment choices It based on the rst-order conditions
we described above (which are evaluated conditionally at DO(Gt, It) and DN (Gt, It), respectively). Her
optimal level of institutional investment, It, is then given by the value that yields the maximum value of (4).
23Formally, the old agent chooses a level of labor, `t, to supply as well. Since we ignore utility from leisure, there is no choice but
to provide labor with ones time. Thus, we drop this formality and embed the optimal labor choice into the decision problem,
as a result of which we have `t = 1.
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Specically, the two levels of investment possible in equilibrium are implicitly dened by It [D
O(Gt; I

t )] and
It [D
N (Gt; I

t )].
Turning to the Citizens problem, all we need to determine is her indirect utility function evaluated at
DO(Gt; I

t ) and D
N (Gt; I

t ), with her optimal choice being dened by:
.
V ot = max
8>>>><>>>>:
log ((1  )At) +  log (1  ) 
[DO(GN , It+1)];
log ((1     z)At) +  log (1  ) 
[DN (GN , It+1)]
9>>>>=>>>>; . (11)
Now consider the fact that there is a new technology employed in period t+ 1 such that GN = GO. In
this case, equation (11) yields:
V ot = max
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
log ((1  )At) +  log (1  ) 
(GO, It+1);
log ((1     z)At) + 
266666666664
(1  2p) log (1  ) 
(GO, It+1)
+p log (1  ) 
(GO + g, It+1 + i)
+p log (1  ) 
(GO   g, It+1   i)
377777777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
. (12)
Predictions We can now illustrate the key contentions of our paper. First, consider how the risk associated
with new ideology, p, a¤ects ideological updating in periods following a shock. As p approaches zero, an
ideological update strictly dominates a traditionalist response for relatively small . To see this, rst observe
that, as p and z approach zero and  approaches one, It+1 approaches I

t+1. Then, the two arguments on
the RHS of equation (12) become strictly equal. One can then see that there are unique pairs of z > 0 and
 < 1 such that the two arguments of (12) remain strictly equal. Thus, for some z > 0, there exists  < 1
that would make the switch to the new ideology unambiguously optimal. As a corollary, the smaller is ,
the more likely it is that parents will choose to instill in their children the new and untested ideology.
By a related argument, the higher is the risk associated with the new and untested ideology, p, the
higher is the likelihood that parents stick with the traditional ideology, despite the changing production
environment and the new technology in e¤ect. To see this, one simply has to note that the payo¤ of the new
ideology strictly decreases in p so long as 
11 < 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium level of institutions chosen by the ruler, It+1 or I

t+1, is decreasing in p. This
results for two reasons. First, as p increases, the parameter space over which the agent chooses DN is
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decreasing. Since the returns to the ruler are greater when the agent transmits ideology DN than they
are when the agent transmits the traditional ideology, an increase in p weakly decreases the rulers optimal
institutional choice. Second, the ruler faces a probabilistic set of outcomes associated with the new ideology.
Like the agent, the payo¤ to the ruler of the new ideology strictly decreases in p so long as 
11 < 0. We
summarize these insights in the following proposition (for complete proofs of the following two propositions,
see Appendix A).
Proposition 1 Both the optimal level of institutions (It+1 or I

t+1) and the parameter space over which the
agent chooses the updated ideology (DN ) are weakly decreasing in p, ceteris paribus.
Next, we turn to comparative statics with respect to the size of the shock, . First consider how the size
of the shock a¤ects ideological updating in periods following a shock. It follows directly from (12) that the
new ideology becomes unambiguously more attractive as  increases, so long as  < 1. Thus, it must be
the case that, when  is relatively small so that the prevailing, traditional ideology is fairly ine¤ective in
mapping onto labor productivity from new technologies and institutions, the parameter space over which the
agent chooses the new ideology is increasing in . It likewise follows that the rulers institutional choice is
increasing in . To see this, note that the agent is more likely to choose the productivity-enhancing ideology
at higher levels of  and, in any case, 
 is increasing in  regardless of the agents choice. Combined, these
insights yield the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When  is su¢ ciently small, both the optimal level of institutions (It+1 or I

t+1) and the
parameter space over which the agent chooses the updated ideology (DN ) are weakly increasing in , ceteris
paribus.
Finally, we represent graphically our key insights with a 22 gure (see Figure 1). The two propositions
indicate that whether ideology updates in equilibrium is dependent on p and , ceteris paribus. When the
size of the shock () is small, ideology is unlikely to update regardless of the uncertainty associated with
updating. As the size of the shock grows, ideology is still likely to remain traditional when uncertainty (p)
is large.
Interpreting this gure further, consider the case where  is small, meaning (by denition) that the
traditional ideology returns low levels of G and I. In this case, a shock will lead to a small amount of institu-
tional change if ideology remains traditional and a large amount of institutional change if ideology updates.
Moreover, institutional change will have little e¤ect on outcomes if ideology remains traditional, since the
mapping from actual institutions to outcomes (via DO) greatly reduces the e¤ectiveness of institutions. As
seen in Figure 1, it follows that when p is large, a large shock (i.e., high ) may lead to some institutional
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change without ideological change. We keep this insight in mind as we turn to a series of analytic narratives
on which the model sheds light and vice versa.
3 Historical Evidence
In this section, we support the insights of the model with three historical analytical narratives. Each of these
narratives highlights the ideological and institutional reaction of non-Western societies when rst confronted
with Western technologies. These are precisely the conditions examined by the model. Western technologies
and organizational forms o¤ered massive productivity improvements when rst introduced, yet they also
carried immense uncertainty regarding how they would "t" the existing ideological base upon which non-
Western societies were built. The narratives cover the Ottoman Empires evolving political and institutional
responses to a rapidly industrializing Europe, the rapid industrialization and modernization of the Japanese
economy during the Meiji era, following conservative reform episodes during the Tokugawa Shogunate, and
the inward turn of Qing China during the Tongzhi Restoration.
3.1 The Ottoman Empire
It was by no means obvious in the 16th century that the Ottoman Empire would eventually fall behind its
Western European rivals. Territorially, the Empire expanded throughout the century and eventually ruled
most of the North African coast, the Arabian Peninsula, the Balkan Peninsula, and the Middle East. Indeed,
the Ottomans repeatedly threatened the great powers of central and southern Europe Spain, Venice, and
the Holy Roman Empire.
Yet, by the end of the 17th century, the Ottomans had clearly fallen behind. Even prior to the Industrial
Revolution, this reversal of fortune was especially apparent with respect to technology (Mokyr 1990). The
Ottomans were hardly unaware that the tables began to turn in the seventeenth century; they were in close
contact with the West when profound economic changes were beginning to take shape in Europe. As early
as the rst part of the seventeenth century, the Ottomans seem to have caught on rather quickly that the
world was rapidly changing. The prototype reformist sultan was Osman II, whose reign lasted from 1618 to
1622. He was followed by Sultan Murad IV (r. 162340) and the exceptional era of Grand Vizier Mehmed
Köprülü (r. 165683), who both followed up with reforms of their own.
In our model, productivity shocks, , are much more likely to result in improved institutions to accom-
modate such changes when individuals (or most of society) decide to update their prevailing ideologies in
response to the shock. Yet, ideology only updates if the uncertainty (p) associated with new and heretofore
unused ideology is su¢ ciently small. When uncertainty is large, ideology regarding the appropriateness of
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the "new economy" to the societys resource base will not update, and there will be little incentive for the
ruling elite to update institutions. As we will argue below, the latter insight provides an explanation for
the initial Ottoman reaction to Western advancements and, in particular, why the early reformist sultans
advocated conservative reforms.
Ottoman rulers clearly recognized that change was occurring in the West. Yet, their operating premise
was the inferiority of anything Western an ideology that was justiable in the sixteenth century context in
which it emerged. The "traditionalist reform period" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was built
on this ideal of Ottoman superiority (Shaw 1976, p. 175). Contemporary observers viewed Ottoman failure
vis-à-vis the West as a failure to apply the techniques and organizational forms employed under the glorious
reign of Süleyman the Magnicent (r. 1520-66), a period often viewed as the apex of Ottoman power. In
other words, reform could only be achieved by returning to the "traditional" way of doing things.24
The traditionalist reform period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was characterized by an
entire class of Ottoman political observers commenting on the decline of the empire, focusing primarily on
deviations from the norms of Süleymans reign (Howard 1988; Dale 2010). One inuential pre-cursor of
these observers was Mustafa Ali (1541-1600), who wrote a history of the empire during a time of Ottoman
expansion i.e., before it was obvious that the empire had fallen behind leading European powers. Alis
treatise is characteristic of what would become the genre. It laments the "rising corruption, disruption of
the military, the declining power of viziers, the loss of authority of the madrasa-trained intellectual elite, ...
economic problems, and the pernicious inuence of the harem" (Dale 2010, p. 270). If the sultan and his
administrators could just return to the pious and honest rule of Süleyman and his predecessors, Ottoman
decline would be arrested.25
The most important and skilled writer on Ottoman stagnation was Koçi Beg, an intimate advisor of
Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623-40). Koçi Begs most important contributions to the reform literature included a
treatise for Sultan Murad IV in 1630 and a description of Ottoman institutions and terminology for Sultan
Ibrahim in 1640 (Howard 1988, p. 64; Lewis 1973, p. 203-7). Throughout his writings many of which
were used extensively by later writers of the genre the concept of a past "Golden Age" under Süleyman
is a dominant theme (or, the "imagined perfection" of the era before Süleyman, as denoted by Colin Imber
24 In our model, the ruler does not have an ideology (although we extend the model in the Appendix to permit the ruler to have
an "optimal ideology"). Yet, according to the model, the ruler must assess the prevailing ideology when choosing institutions.
As we attempt to make clear throughout the narratives, Ottoman, Japanese, and Chinese rulers were not necessarily acting in
accordance with their own ideologies, but in accordance with the prevailing ideologies of the citiizenry as transmitted to them
via trusted advisors and reformers.
25Along these same lines, Lewis (2002, p. 45) notes how traditional Ottoman reforms emphasized a return to cultural and
ideological roots: The nal answers given by traditional writers to the older formulation of the question [why did the West
leap ahead?] were always let us go back to our roots, to the good old ways, to the true faith, to the word of the God.With that
of course there was always the assumption that if things are going badly, we were being punished by God for having abandoned
the true path.
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[2016]). It was under Süleyman that administrative practices reached their ideal, but this ideal was long
past: "It is a long time since the high-chambered household of the lofty Sultanate (may it remain under the
protection of eternal grace) was served by solicitous, well-intentioned, worthy ulema and by obedient, self-
e¤acing, willing slaves. Today the state of a¤airs having changed, and evil, upheaval, sedition, and dissension
having passed all bounds, I have sought occasion to observe the causes and reasons of these changes, and
bring them to the Imperial and august ear" (quoted in Lewis 1973, p. 203). In this view, it was the laziness
of the sultan, the debasement of the Grand Vizier, the bloating of the Janissaries, and the venality of the
judges all practices far removed from the glories of the "imagined perfection" of the past that were at
fault for Ottoman decline (Lewis 1973, p. 204-6).
Koçi Begs writings were characteristic of the entire "traditionalist reform" genre, with its emphasis on
traditional ideology (Dale 2010, p. 272).26 Yet these writings were also optimistic, noting that a return to
the past was all that was needed to bring back lost glory: "The enemies of the faith, seeing the good order
and stability ... will say, in helpless fear and envy: The House of Osman lay for sixty years in neglectful
sleep, but now they are wide-awake, and have begun to make good the shortcomings of past days" (quoted
in Lewis 1973, p. 207).
Simply put, it was not obvious to the Ottomans of the time that European institutions were superior to
Ottoman ones, particularly those put in place during the Ottoman rise to power. The ideology through which
the Ottomans viewed European advances made it impossible to adopt these advances in any meaningful way,
since they clashed with the ideological belief of Ottoman superiority. Indeed, there was genuine uncertainty
whether European productivity improvements would work in a society that deemed them inferior. If it were
just a matter of transplanting institutions independent of ideology, this would have been straight-forward
enough. But ideological beliefs centered on the superiority of Ottoman institutions were slow to update. In
the process, Ottoman institutions fell behind. This is a classic case of the "traditionalist equilibrium" we
describe in the model. In the face of a vastly changing world, Ottoman beliefs in their own superiority failed
to change and, as a consequence, Ottoman institutions failed to accommodate institutional and technological
advances.
The failure of the t¬mar system provides an excellent example of the interaction between antiquated
institutions and traditionalist ideological beliefs. At the height of Ottoman power in the fteenth and early
sixteenth centuries, the sultan derived two-thirds to three quarters of his revenue through the t¬mar system, a
military lease contract whereby the provincial cavalry collected agricultural taxes directly from the peasantry
26For instance, an anonymous treatise entitled Kita¯b-i Müstetäb from about 1620 argues that the Ottomans were successful from
the founding of the dynasty until the reign of Mura¯d III (1574-1595) because they followed Sharia (Islamic law) and kanun
(secular law) and had just administration. The author contrasts that situation with the present, where decline versus the West
had already commenced (Howard 1988, p. 71). For many more examples, see Lewis (1973, ch. 15), Howard (1988), and Dale
(2010, p. 270-287).
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as remuneration for their military services to the state. The t¬mar system was similar to the tax collection
system of feudal Europe, where local feudal lords controlled revenues in return for military service. But as
Ottoman expansion ceased and the sultan was no longer able to provide new t¬mars to the military elite,
the system began to fail and the central government received less tax revenue (·Inalc¬k 1973, ch. 13; Hourani
1991, ch.13; Cos¸gel and Miceli 2005). To address this revenue shortfall, the state eventually (in 1695) sought
larger short-term payouts in return for lifetime tax farms under an institution known as the malikane system.
But this system failed, too, as tax farmers passed down their farms to their heirs instead of returning them
to the state, and some tax farmers stopped sending in revenues altogether (Pamuk 2004; Balla and Johnson
2009).
The Ottoman failure to extract revenue stands in stark contrast to what the leading European economies
were able to achieve. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were precisely the period when the leading
European powers built large scal apparatuses and sovereign debt markets. They achieved this via institu-
tions that constrained rulers and centralized tax collection (North and Weingast 1989; Dincecco 2009). As
a result, a nation as small as the Dutch Republic was able to collect 42.5% more taxes than the Ottoman
Empire by the 1650s despite having less than one tenth of its population. In per capita terms, the Dutch
collected over 15 times the revenue of the Ottomans, and the Spanish, French, Venetians, and English all
collected at least ve times the per-capita revenue of the Ottomans (Karaman and Pamuk 2010, 2013).
How did Ottoman advisors and intellectuals respond to the decline of the t¬mar system? Instead of looking
to Europe for solutions and clearly certain European polities had found better institutional solutions to
tax collection Ottoman writers placed blame on corruption within the t¬mar system (Howard 1988, pp.
59-73). If only the Ottomans could employ the system like it was used at the height of Ottoman power under
Süleyman (and before), decline could be arrested. It was corruption and nepotism among t¬mar holders, not
the t¬mar institution itself, that required mending. This is typical of the "traditional equilibrium" described
in the model. The prevailing Ottoman ideology was founded upon the belief that Ottoman institutions and
technologies were superior to those of the West. Clearly, by this point in time, this ideology was obsolete.
In the terms of the model, this traditional ideology had a low  that is, the perceived value of Western
technology and institutions was much lower than their actual value. What was needed was the recognition
that Western technology and institutions were more advanced than Ottoman ones, something that the
prevailing Ottoman ideology failed to provide.
It was only after the Ottoman-Europe disparity became su¢ ciently large and obvious that the Ottomans
accepted the superiority of European institutions and technology. Historians date the beginning of the
Ottomansdecline to the Peace of Karlowitz signed between the Holy League and the Ottomans in 1699.
With that treaty, the Ottomans ceded most of Hungary, Transylvania, and Slovenia to Austria; Podolia to
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Poland; and most of Dalmatia to Venice. Karlowitz also marked the ushering in of the second-generation
Ottoman reforms (Shaw 1976, p. 225). The reforms, for the rst time, recognized that an appropriate
response to European advancements was only achievable by discovering what Europe had done to pull ahead
in the rst place and to emulate it. Even then, there was an attempt to keep technology and ideology
transfers conned to the military and national defense realms (Lewis 2002, p. 81). The fact that military
reforms took precedence over others helped subordinate the hurdles of cultural and religious beliefs, but it
did not ensure the successful implementation of the necessary reforms, as the empire was slow to adapt and
it held the view that the fundamentals of its own military organization were superior to the West (Imber
2002, p. 284).
It was not until the 19th century unveiling of the Tanzimat Decree by Sultan Abdülmecid I (1839) that
the Ottomans began to adopt Western institutions. These reforms rejected traditional ideology. They were
heavily inuenced by European ideas including the superiority of parliamentary democracy as a political
system and the Enlightenments emphasis on rationality and education with the intent to e¤ectuate a
fundamental change from the old system based on theocratic principles to that of a modern state. This
turnabout is explicable in the context of the model. As the size of the "shock" () increases, there is a
greater benet of investing in new ideologies better-suited for the new economy. When  is su¢ ciently large,
as it almost certainly was in the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, investments in new ideology will
be made even if there is signicant uncertainty regarding the impact of this new ideology.
The culmination of this ideological change was the Tanzimat Decree: the earliest constitutional document
in any Muslim country. The decree culminated with the establishment of the rst ever House of Parliament in
the Muslim world, the Meclisi Mebusan, in 1876 (Kinross, 1979, p. 474). It encompassed a series of reforms
promulgated in the Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1876 under the reigns of the sultans Abdülmecid I
(r. 1839-61) and Abdülaziz I (r. 1861-76). Many of the key provisions of the Tanzimat reforms were set forth
in the Hatt-¬ S¸erif of Gülhane (1839). This document called for the establishment of new institutions that
would guarantee security of life, property, and honor to all subjects of the empire regardless of their religion
or race. It also authorized the development of a standardized system of taxation to eliminate abuses and
established fairer methods of military conscription and training. The promises of equality for non-Muslims
(mainly Christians and Jews) living in the empire were not always carried out, but the balance of the changes
provided for in the Noble Edict, along with other reform measures, were implemented principally under the
leadership of Mustafa Res¸id Pas¸a, who served six terms as grand vizier. The reforms included institutional
adoption from across Europe, such as the development of a new secular school system, the reorganization
of the army based on the Prussian conscript system, the creation of provincial representative assemblies,
and the introduction of new codes of commercial and criminal law, which were largely modeled after those
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of France. These laws were administered by newly established state courts independent of the ulema¯, the
Islamic religious council.
But these reforms came too late. By the late 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was known as the "sick
man of Europe", and its remnants were carved up by the victors of the First World War. What was a
once powerful empire fell behind and could not catch up not because it was incapable of adopting Western
institutions, but because for too long the ideological beliefs of its people were incompatible with the adoption
of Western techniques.
3.2 The Road to Modern Japan
Eighteenth and nineteenth century Japan, which witnessed the decline and fall of the Tokugawa Shogun
followed by the Meiji Restoration, is another relevant case that highlights the key dynamics of our hypoth-
esis. In particular, the last few decades of the Tokugawa era were exemplied by a number of reformist
movements, almost all of which had a traditionalist spirit in the sense we dened above. By contrast, the
Meiji Restoration was an initiative aimed at transforming Japanese society, economy, and institutions based
on an acknowledgment of Western superiority.
The reform attempts during the Tokugawa Shogunate began in the early eighteenth century with those
undertaken during the Kyo¯ho¯ era. These reforms were primarily a response to political economy disruptions
associated with the rise of urban commercialism (Jensen 2000, pp. 238-9). Their most prominent features
included renovations in the educational system and the intellectual realm based on the orthodoxy of Chi
Hsi Confucianism. Later, during the waning decades of the Tokugawa era, a new set of reforms known
as the "Tenpo¯ reforms" enacted ad hoc emergency responses to a series of natural disasters that widened
Japanese sociopolitical rifts. These, too, aimed to reform education with a heavy emphasis on the traditional
Confucian teachings and discipline (Jansen 2000, pp. 243, 248).
The common thread connecting Samurai discontent and social criticism toward the demise of the Toku-
gawa Shogunate was a fundamentally traditionalist outlook based on Confucian principles. Early interactions
with Western powers, even when they revealed direct or indirect evidence of the superiority of their tech-
nologies and institutional organizations, were met with some degree of existential denial (Duus 1976). As
a result, the practical reforms undertaken by the Tokugawa regime were heavily inuenced by attempts to
restore traditional Japanese morality, spirituality, and philosophies guided by conventional Confucian ideas.
Much like the Ottoman reformers discussed in the previous section, Tokugawa reformers believed that tra-
ditionalist morals and political standards were correct in spite of an obviously changing world. What went
wrong, according to this idea, was the failure of society to live up to these traditionalist standard (Duus 1976,
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p. 53). Few critics called for an overthrow of the old system. They instead blamed the people empowered
by the traditionalist system for not living up to its standards.
By stark contrast, the Meiji Restoration was a wholesale reform initiative based on an acknowledgment
that the traditional social, political, and economic organization of Japanese society was inadequate to deal
with the modern challenges of adopting Western technologies and methods of production. Based on our
hypothesis, it was driven by an eventual recognition that Western technologies and institutional organizations
involved a degree of superiority that was signicantly more advanced than those in Japan and, thus, that their
adoption at the expense of Japanese traditional ways were worth the uncertainty regarding how they would
clash with Japanese ideology. To put things in the context of our model, the size of the shock () associated
with Western technologies was, by the middle of the 19th century, signicant and apparently large enough
relative to the uncertainty associated with updated ideology (p) that the Japanese were willing to adopt
Western methods. And it is this new and progressive ideology, which acknowledged Western technological
and institutional superiority, that formed the basis of the subsequent institutional reforms that were enacted.
The most obvious Japanese weaknesses relative to the West were in the realm of military and economics.
The Meiji government feared not without reason that these weaknesses would make them easy prey for
an enterprising Western power (Allen 1981, pp. 32, 33). Consequently, the Meiji regime adopted Western
methods in both war and industry. Among the most important of the economic reforms was an abolition of
the old regimes restrictions on freedom of movement and enterprise. Such restrictions served the agrarian
Tokugawa regime well, but they were completely unsuitable for an industrial economy. Other socio-economic
reforms included an active industrial policy funded, in large part, by a more e¢ cient tax collection system
made possible by the greater powers of the centralized government, and the introduction of a system of
universal education. The changes to political institutions were equally revolutionary. Political authority and
power were consolidated with the central government, and the reformers enacted a conscription law as the
basis of the modern Japanese military, paving the way for the eventual fall of the samurai (Duus 1976, pp.
76-86; Allen, 1981, p. 2). More generally, the Imperial Oath of 1868 committed the new government to
"convocation of an assembly and public discussionon matters of state, unity of all cases high and low
in promoting the national welfare, abandonment of absurd customs of olden timesand conformity to the
principles of international justiceand an e¤ort at seeking knowledge from all over the world." (Duus 1976,
p. 74-75).
The transformative nature of the Meiji Restoration was best manifested in the degree to which the
intellectual elites began to study and analyze the ways of the West. Beginning in the 1850s, Japanese writers
were increasingly sent abroad to study in the West. Many more learned about the West by studying books.
These writers and scholars emerged as the intellectual elite in the 1860s and 1870s, replacing those versed
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in the Confucian style. It was this group that would produce the translations and original works that would
ultimately disseminate knowledge of the West to the educated classes (Duus 1976, p. 87). This is a straight-
forward and important example of the type of ideological updates and transformations we describe in the
model. By sending their children to Europe for education, members of the Japanese elite exposed their
children to both Western techniques and the Western ideologies that enabled these techniques to function.
An important feature of Japanese history over the relevant time span is the changing function and e¤ect
of education on social and institutional reforms. In particular, the education system was used explicitly
as the medium through which the Confucian philosophy (ideology, in our parlance) was intergenerationally
transmitted during the Tokugawa period, when the reforms had a clear traditionalist bend. This tradition-
alism was exemplied by Sadanobu, a daimyo¯ (feudal lord) and prominent reformer during the Tokugawa
era. Sadanobu was most famous for his nancial reforms, enacted as part of the "Kansei prohibition". The
prohibition forbade dissident teachings; only the teachings of Chu Hsi Confucianism were permitted under
this law. The "Novel doctrinesof recent times, he decreed, threatened the order of the realm; there was to
be a returnto a central doctrine." (Jensen 2000, p. 43).
By contrast, one of the most signicant achievements of the Meiji era was the expansion and changing
content of formal education and its interplay with other Meiji transformations in the institutional and
economic realms. The introduction of universal education based on both the general and the technical was
widely accepted. Education increasingly played a role in Meiji government policy, with the government
spending more on education as a share of national income than many of the Western powers (Allen 1981,
pp. 2, 3).
In short, the Japanese case conforms well to two di¤erent equilibria emanating from the model. When
rst confronted with rising urban commercialism and Western economic and military aggression both of
which were associated with signicant uncertainty regarding how they would "t" with prevailing Japanese
ideology the Japanese response was overwhelmingly traditionalist. It was recognized that reforms were
needed, but the traditionalist bent of these reforms was typical of an equilibrium in which institutions and
ideologies change little in the face of a productivity shock carrying a high level of uncertainty. On the
contrary, once it was clear just how large the shock was, the benets of ideological updating overwhelmed
the negative consequences associated with high uncertainty. In turn, a "virtuous cycle" emerged where
ideological updating encouraged institutional change, which triggered further ideological updating, and so
forth.
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3.3 Qing China
As our nal historically relevant case, we consider Qing China (1644-1912), which presents a particularly
illuminating example of a traditionalist response to foreign technological and institutional innovations. Prior
to the Qing, it was not obvious that the West had pulled ahead economically and technologically. Indeed,
prior to the fteenth century, China far surpassed Europe in technological capability. In this period, the
transfer of technologies overwhelmingly owed from East to West inventions such as paper, the compass,
printing, gunpowder, iron plow, blast furnace, water clock, crossbow, and trebuchet were made in China
centuries before their adoption in Europe (Mokyr 1990). However, by the dawn of the sixteenth century,
numerous Western European technologies surpassed that of China. The observation led Mokyr (1990, p.
209) to argue that the greatest enigma in the history of technology is the failure of China to sustain
its technological supremacy.Chinese time-measuring technologies, ocean shipping, and block printing (as
opposed to movable type) are examples of technologies in which China had reigned supreme for centuries but
fell behind Europe by 1500 C.E. In spite of Chinas head start in knowledge of explosives, European military
technology was far superior to anything found in China by the dawn of the sixteenth century (Needham
1986). When the Portuguese reached Chinas shores in 1514, the superiority of European muskets and
cannons was apparent to all, and the Chinese rapidly adopted these weapons (Cipolla 1965; Hacker 1977).
In the face of two contemporaneous crises the rapid decimation of Chinese forces by the British in the
First Opium War (1839-42) and numerous internal revolts, with the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) being the
most bloody and dangerous to the regimes future the Qing realized the need to modernize their economy
and military. Revenues were too low to contain further rebellion (Ma and Rubin 2017), while the Qing faced
an existential crisis of European domination that was temporarily relieved by their acquiescing to humiliating
trade deals that gave Westerners extraordinary commercial powers within China. The adoption of Western
institutions would have o¤ered a solution to Chinas relative stagnation; politically constrained rulers, like
those of the leading European powers, could have raised much more tax revenue and issued sovereign debt,
while opening up markets and reducing the arbitrary powers of government o¢ cials would have encouraged
the adoption of more e¢ cient techniques and technologies (Ma and Rubin 2017).
In the terms of our model, the productivity shock () faced by the Qing was large, but it only would
have translated into productivity gains if institutions and ideologies more commensurate with the "new
economy" were adopted. But it was also highly uncertain how such new ideologies would have interacted
with previously established Chinese institutions ones that had served generations of Chinese rulers very
well in the past.
The most important of these institutions was the bureaucracy, with its grounding in Confucian ideals.
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Bureaucrats were the primary tax collectors, dispensers of law and order, chief instruments of peasantry
control, and legitimators of the state. The bureaucracy was by nature a traditionalist group, as it was
tasked with providing stability rather than technological or economic improvement (Fei 1953; Wright 1957,
p. 60-63; Chesneaux and Needham 1964, p. 593; Cipolla 1965; Mokyr 1990, p. 235-37). The ideal Confucian
political system was based on an ethic of enduring value, one that would work just as well in one epoch as
another (Wright 1957, p. 2). This is precisely the type of traditionalism we have in mind in our description
of "traditionalist ideology."
The Qing responded to the mid-nineteenth century crises with a set of policies known as the "Tongzhi
Restoration" (1862-74), a period in which modernizing policies were enacted. These policies were imple-
mented via the old, conservative bureaucratic institutions, led by scholars steeped in conservative Confucian
ideology (Wright 1957). Instead of adopting Western governance, scal, or tax-collecting institutions, the
Qing much like the Tokugawa era reformers in Japan attempted to apply practical or rational Western
knowledge without adopting the Western ideologies and institutions that made this knowledge useful in the
rst place. For example, in order to deal with diplomacy with the European powers, the Qing government
simply grafted a modern foreign relation o¢ ce onto the bureaucracy, rather than removing the bureaucracy
from foreign relations altogether (Wright 1957, p. 8).27 Instead of seeking knowledge of the technological
revolution occurring in Europe, the Chinese elites remained engrossed in preparing for the civil service ex-
ams based on knowledge of Chinese classics (Ma 2004). Chinese "borrowing" of Western know-how and
technology but not ideology or institutions is summarized by the famous formula: "Chinese learning as the
basis; Western learning for practical use" (Wright 1957, p. 1).
A key element of the Restorations was the so-called "Self-Strengthening Movement", which discouraged
private enterprise, disparaged commerce and foreign trade, emphasized agriculture above all other forms
of economic activity, encouraged frugality, and discouraged investment in infrastructure in favor of "tradi-
tional" handicrafts (Wright 1957, ch. 8-9). As a result, private modern industry had no legal status in China
until the 20th century (Brown 1979; Ma 2004). These policies in turn resulted in the loss of leadership in
one of Chinas most important industries, sericulture (silk production) to Japan, whose Meiji government
implemented Western reforms strongly encouraging private enterprise (despite its negative e¤ects on tradi-
tional manufacturers) and important infrastructure such as the telegraph (Ma 2005). Those directing the
Self-Strengthening Movement displayed little interest in supplying modern public goods or supporting pri-
vate initiatives. They were even opposed to private e¤orts to build public goods such as railroads or inland
steam shipping (Ma 2004, p. 374).
27 It should be noted that the introduction of a modern foreign relations o¢ ce was one of the most successful endeavors of the
era, as it resulted in numerous accomplished diplomats and better foreign relations for China (Wright 1957, p. 8).
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The Qing responses to Western advancement and its own internal troubles is a particularly straight-
forward example of what we mean by a "traditionalist equilibrium". In the face of a rapidly changing
world a world that was obviously much more e¢ cient than the world of previous Chinese glory the Qing
refrained from adopting the ideologies and institutions that were responsible for Western economic success.
The uncertainty related to whether Western ideological beliefs were more suitable than the prevailing Chinese
ideological beliefs, which were steeped in a Confucian ethic that was often inconsistent with Western ideals,
discouraged the Qing from adopting Western advancements despite very clear evidence that they were more
e¢ cient. It was only after Chinas failure to modernize became all the more obvious during the Sino-Japanese
War (1894-95) that the failure of the empires bureaucrats and leaders to grasp the obvious became inevitable:
China had fallen behind. After all, the Westernizing Meiji reforms that Japan had recently undertaken
clearly enabled their humiliating victory over China. In this context, the Chinese nally considered major
institutional changes. By then, however, it was too late; the Qing dynasty was on its last legs and would
collapse in 1912.28
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the failure of societies to adopt
benecial institutions even when adoption entails undeniable e¢ ciency gains and is in the interest of the
politically powerful and why these failures so often coincide with a rise in traditionalist ideology.
Our model emphasizes the role that ideological beliefs play in this process. According to our model,
economic fundamentals and institutions translate into output via a societys ideology how people employ
simplifying heuristics to comprehend the best they can the complex world around them. Ideologies can and
do evolve in response to a changing world, but ideological change carries with it signicant uncertainty.
When one does not know how those new simplifying heuristics associated with new ideologies will interact
with her economic and institutional environment, she may refrain from updating her (or her childrens)
28Viewed from the comparative perspective of our model, the stark di¤erences in the Japanese and Chinese experiences discussed
above are highly illuminating. In particular, one could be puzzled by the relatively rapid ideological adjustments undertaken in
Japan, followed by fairly radical and successful institutional reforms, versus the much more muted, delayed, and unsuccessful
responses in China. There is a developed literature on the China-Japan divergence; see Koyama, Moriguchi, and Sng (2017)
for insights and citations. On the one hand, there exists a body of literature in comparative economic development that argues
that Chinese social institutions were built upon and supported conservative decision-making. For example, Greif et al. (2012,
2013) and Greif and Tabellini (2017) advance the idea that the Chinese clan system was heavily controlled by family elders.
Coupled with the sizable literature and empirical evidence on increasing risk aversion with age (Einav and Cohen 2007; Graham,
Harvey, and Puri 2013; Halek and Eisenhauer 2001; Riley and Chow 1992), such papers argue that Chinese clans were slow to
change. If true, this would also account for the comparative di¤erences in ideological change in China versus Japan, even if
the risk involved with new ideology adoption and benets of new Western technologies were perceived to be identical in both
countries. Yet, one could also easily interpret these di¤erences in the light of our model. For Chinese clan leaders, appealing to
old ideologies worked well for them and they had for centuries. Hence, the risk (p) associated with new (Western) ideologies was
signicant. The same could be said of the Japanese shoguns, which is why their ideology remained conservative. But, when the
shoguns lost political power, those who replaced them had much less to lose from appealing to a di¤erent (Western) ideology
(i.e., p was lower). It is likely that both interpretations are valid, and we choose not to dismiss one in favor of the other.
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ideology. This in turn discourages institutional change, since the full benets of new institutions will not be
realized.
The insights provided by the model and three analytic narratives (on Ottoman, Japanese, and Chinese
reform initiatives) provide an explanation for why institutional reforms by themselves have historically not
been the elixir of economic development. Our insights suggest that institutional reforms will not likely
achieve their desired results unless they are associated with an update in ideology that is more suitable
for the changing economic environment. In each of the three cases we study, the societies long-standing
ideological beliefs were impediments to meaningful institutional reforms. When these societies were exposed
to more sophisticated and advanced technologies, early reform attempts were fundamentally traditionalist
in nature.
These insights have implications for various 21st-century e¤orts to impose democratic or economic insti-
tutions on societies whose ideologies are not equipped to handle them. For instance, attempts at instilling
democracy in formerly autocratic states in the Middle East (e.g., Iraq and Egypt) ended in dysfunction.
Likewise, Russia experienced massive corruption when implementing capitalist reforms following the fall of
communism. In these examples, societies that were culturally unready for massive institutional change were
unable to adopt the intended changes in a functional manner.
More generally, this insight suggests that the "exogenous" imposition of institutional or economic reforms
is unlikely to work unless the society is on an ideological path to implementing those reforms anyway. In other
words, unless institutional reforms come on the back of transformations in a societys prevalent ideologies
(commensurate with the new technological and institutional realities), they are likely to have neither a
meaningful nor a lasting impact. Not only might reforms implemented in the absence of the appropriate
cultural capital fail to succeed, but they might also encourage traditionalist movements to take hold, making
future reforms all the more di¢ cult to implement. Well-intentioned e¤orts to improve economic or political
institutions in the developing world may therefore backre, while putting in place cultural hurdles that make
future improvements all the less likely.
A¢ liations:
Iyigun: University of Colorado
Rubin: Chapman University
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let
V ot (G
O)  log ((1  )At) +  log (1  ) 
(GO; It+1) , (A.1)
and, let
V ot (G
N )  log ((1     z)At) + 
266666666664
(1  2p) log (1  ) 
(GO, It+1)
+p log (1  ) 
(GO + g, It+1 + i)
+p log (1  ) 
(GO   g, It+1   i)
377777777775
. (A.2)
Denoting V ot (G
O)   V ot (GN ) = V and provided that 
(0, It+1) = 
(GO, 0) = 0, we then have
lim
!0
V < 0 , and lim
!1
V > 0 : (A.3)
and,
@V
@
=
GO
1(G
O; 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(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It+1)
> 0 ,
@V
@z
=   At
(1     z)At < 0 , (A.4)
@V
@p
= 

2 log 
(GO, It+1)  log 
(GO + g, It+1 + i)  log 
(GO   g, It+1   i)

> 0 .
According to (A.3) and (A.4), V is continuous and strictly increasing in . Thus, for any given level of
p, z 2 (0; 1), 9 ~ 2 (0; 1) such that V = 0. Combined with the fact that @V=@p > 0, we establish that,
for any combination of , z 2 (0; 1), increases in p make it more likely that V > 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
First, note that
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where, 8 p; z 2 (0; 1), we can easily verify that
lim
!0
@V
@
< 0 : (A.6)
On this basis, we conclude that, when  is su¢ ciently small so that @V=@ < 0, it is more likely that
citizens choose DN over DO. The rst part of the proposition then directly follows from the observations
that, for Dj , j = O, N , @
=@ = 
1 > 0 ^ 
12 > 0. Consequently, @E(At)=@It in (9) is strictly increasing
in , as a result of which the optimal institutional investments, It+1 and I

t+1, are both increasing in  as
well.
B Extensions: The Rulers Optimal Ideology
B.1 Dynamics with Ruler having a Preferred Ideology
Thus far, we constructed the model to show a "lower bound scenario" under which a traditional ideology can
persist in spite of changing economic circumstances. According to our formulation, the ruler has incentive to
maximize the welfare of the citizenry and adjust institutions accordingly. Hence, rulers consider the positive
e¤ect of their institutional choice on the societys prevalent ideology. However, if the role of ideology is to
help individuals make generalizations about the complex environment within which they operate, it is easy
to imagine the ruler having an optimal ideology, DR(Gt, It) =

Gt, IR
	
, which lends it political legitimacy
and justies its rule. Under this conceptualization, the Ruler desires that the technology is fully perceived
without bias with respect to its TFP impact,29 but institutions are perceived in a manner that benets the
ruler. For example, a despot may want its citizens to view institutions as working well even when they are
not. Historical examples of ideologies that attempt to legitimate rule in such a manner include the "divine
right of kings" doctrine employed by the English Stuart dynasty and Louis XIV of France, the Mandate
of Heaven claimed by numerous Chinese emperors, or various Islamic doctrines supporting rulers who "act
consistent with the faith" (Greif and Rubin 2015; Ma and Rubin 2017; Rubin 2017).
29This assumption is not necessary for results to hold, but it permits us to focus on the relationship between the Rulers ideology
and institutions, the latter of which the Ruler can a¤ect.
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We consider a minimal alteration to the Rulers utility function. In this version of the model, the further
the deviation in the societys perceived institutions from the Rulers optimal perceived institutions (IR) the
lower the Rulers survival probability. We therefore interpret DR as the ideological basis for legitimacy in
the Rulers society (Greif and Rubin 2015), with any deviations from DR undermining the Rulers legitimacy
(and hence its capacity to stay in power). We operationalize this update to the model by having the Ruler
maximize:
URt =
1X
j=t
264 1
1 +

~It   IR
2
375
j t
E

yj   c (Ij) jsoj ; sRj

. (B.1)
In other words, when Dot = D
R, (B.1) is the same as the Rulers utility function laid out previously in
equation (4). As Dot diverges from D
R and hence ~It diverges from IR the probability that the Ruler stays
in power decreases. Note that deviations in either direction decrease the Rulers survival probability. This
is consistent with the idea, for instance, that the type of ideology that legitimates a democratically elected
leader would not work to legitimate a tribal leader, while the tribal ideology that legitimates the leader
would be useless in a democracy.
The Rulers optimal set of institutions, denoted I 0t and I
0
t , is augmented from those derived in Section
2.2.2, while the decision-making calculus of the old agent is the same as in Section 2.2.2. I 0t and I
0
t di¤er
from It and I

t in that the Ruler chooses a level of It that pulls institutions closer to I
R. For any set of
parameters which imply that ~It > IR in the model presented in Section 2.2.2, the ruler chooses a weakly
lower value of It in the present model. Meanwhile, for any set of parameters which imply that ~It < IR in
the model presented in Section 2.2.2, the ruler chooses a higher value of It.
More importantly, the equilibrium reaction to the technology shock with be di¤erent under the present
specication. When ~It < IR the Ruler responds to a shock by choosing more advanced institutions than it
did under the specication presented in Section 2.2.2. Hence, there is a smaller part of the parameter space
over which the traditional ideology persists. In the more common case, where ~It > IR, the Ruler responds
to a shock by choosing less advanced institutions than it did under the specication presented in Section 2.
Hence, there is a larger part of the parameter space over which the traditional ideology persists following
the shock.
On the one hand, this result should not be surprising; if the Ruler has incentive to discourage (encourage)
ideological updating, changes in ideology should occur less (more) in equilibrium. But the mechanism
through which this occurs is not obvious. Our model suggests a mechanism: the complementarity between
institutions which the Ruler a¤ects and ideology. In this specication, the Ruler has the capacity to
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indirectly a¤ect ideology through its choice of institutions. In what follows, we tease out the implications of
the model when the Ruler can directly a¤ect ideology via public education.
B.2 Dynamics with Schooling as the Indoctrination Medium
An additional corollary of our extended model is the debilitating impact of new technologies on the stability
of political regimes that rely on some specic ideology and an indoctrination apparatus designed to nourish
such ideology. In our context, new technologies do not destabilize political regimes because they enable more
e¢ cient communication and coordination among the citizenry.30 They do so because improved technology
increases the return to updating ideology, which makes it costlier for rulers to ensure that the prevalent
ideologies do not stray too much from those that legitimize their rule.
In both Japan and the waning years of the Ottoman Empire, there is historical evidence and ample
anecdotal references that the functions and objectives of the public education systems were transformed as
well. Moreover, as we discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 above, the Japanese and Chinese education systems
were used explicitly as the medium through which the Confucian philosophy and its manifest ideologies
indoctrinated the younger generations during the Tokugawa reforms and Tongzhi Restoration, both of which
were inherently conservative (Jansen 2000, p. 243; Wright 1957). However, in the Japanese case, the
subsequent Meiji era was very clearly and consistently characterized as one in which the expansion in and
the changing content of formal education was the primary driver of other fundamental Meiji transformations
in the institutional and economic realms (Allen 1981, pp. 2-3; Duus 1967, p. 89).
As for the late Ottoman era and the early Turkish Republic, the role of education as an indoctrination
medium (relative to a scientic education medium) is only slightly more muddled. The traditional Ottoman
educational system centered around "the elementary mosque schools (mekteps), which gave rudimentary
religious education to the masses, and the higher institutions of learning (medreses), which trained new
members of the ulema [Islamic theological scholars] as well as others entering the Ruling Class" Shaw (pp.
132-33). After The Royal Tanzimat Decree of 1839 which, as we discussed above, aimed to progressively
reform Ottoman society and institutions along Western cleavages, the educational system was intended to
be reoriented toward an objective scientic emphasis. To that end, the General Education Regulation of
1869 (Maarif-I Umumiye Nizamnamesi) announced that primary education would be compulsory and free
for all citizens (G½ok 2007). This objective did not materialize before the empire disintegrated, however,
and Ottoman education continued to harbor elements of religious and political indoctrination in deliberate
attempts to protect and strengthen the crumbling empire. For instance, Sultan Abd½ulhamit strengthened
30For the role of social media on the Arab Spring, see for example, Howard et al. (2011) and Howard and Hussain (2012). For
an historical example of new technology destabilizing the existing political and religious regime, see Rubin (2014).
29
the bureaucracy and invested heavily in education, covering the Empire in a network of secondary schools,
but new European learning was always combined with religious instruction (Mango 1999, pp. 15-16).
Only after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was a major step taken toward universal
secular education. With the 1924 Law on Unication of Education, the Turkish government established a
national secular education system, fashioned on the Western European model, which brought under central
control all scientic and educational institutions, while putting an end to all kinds of religious educational
and training institutions (G½ok 2007). To be sure, Turkish education maintained a heavy dose of nationalist
indoctrination put in the service of the young republic, as primary and secondary education textbooks were
diligently and carefully crafted to unify a friendly narrative on Turkish nationalism, culture, and history.
Nevertheless, literacy rates, which were as low as ten percent, doubled within a decade, continuing to increase
at a rapid clip thereafter. The secular, uniform, and mandatory education laws helped to advance womens
educational attainment and social freedoms at levels theretofore unseen in a Muslim society (Mango 1999,
pp. 494, 533, 535).
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